The Apparent Flow of Human Time: From Semantics to Metaphysics Kasia M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge

​

I propose to bring together discussions on the metaphysics of time and the passage of time with linguistic discussions on the concept of time to address the question of why time seems dynamic. First, I explore the question of the indexicality of time vis-à-vis the indexicality of the first-person perspective, proposing what I call the "meta-indexicality" of time, which explains the apparent dynamics we attribute to time. In my opinion, apparently dynamic human time is essentially static. I maintain that human time is a complex concept. When it comes down to the level of conceptual building blocks, it is static: at the level of these building blocks, time does not flow. It only flows at the level of their specific combinations of culture and language, an explanation that fits with the neo-Whorfian analysis of the relationship between language and thought proposed, for example, for the conceptualization of space (Levinson). Another argument comes from the so-called semi-propositional, meta-representational character of the concept of time: possibly, time as understood in modern space-time physics seeps into common knowledge, but only in terms of semi-understood representational beliefs, semi -propositional (Sperber). This semi-propositional character, paired with the indexicality of the perspective of the self in, for example, an emergentist image (Ismael) that I develop as the 'metaindexical' account of human time, explains the apparent flow as well as the apparent variability rate of the flow. . Finally, I propose that dynamics can be represented by means of a conceptual semantics with a two-level adjoint operator, loosely based on the phenomenal modifier of Torrengo (2017), which consists of the objective qualifier hidden in the scope of the manifest subjective qualifier. SOQ (OCQ (time)) results in a complex concept, but this concept is itself static at the level of its basic components.