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Maria Jose Frápolli

María José Frápolli Sanz (1960) is an internationally recognized Spanish philosopher in the fields of the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic, and the theories of truth. She is currently Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Granada. From 2006 to 2012 she was president of the Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. He studied Philosophy at the University of Granada where he graduated in 1981 and received his doctorate in 1987 with the thesis “The Mathematization of Infinity. The emergence of set theory in the work of G. Cantor ”. In addition to the publication of his doctoral thesis, he has published the works “The Nature Of Truth. An Updated Approach to the Meaning of Truth Ascriptions ”(2012), Springer. An Approach to the Philosophy of Language. MJ Frápolli and E. Romero (1998), Madrid, Synthesis. In addition, he has published the following works: Contemporary Theories of Truth. MJ Frápolli and JA Nicolás (2012), Madrid, Tecnos Filosofía de la Lógica. MJ Frápolli (2007), Madrid, Tecnos, Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. MJ Frápolli (2007), UK, Palgrave-McMillan, FP Ramsey. Complete Philosophical Work. MJ Frápolli (2005), Edition, introduction and translation. Granada, Comares, among others.

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Maria Jose Frápolli

Semantic pluralism and the univocity of truth

MJ Frápolli

University of Granada

An analysis of the functioning of the terms related to the concept of truth requires several theoretical presuppositions that, although present in the literature for many decades, we have only recently become aware of them.

The first presupposition is the Propositional Priority Principle (PPP):

(PPP): Propositions are the minimum carriers of logical properties.

The second presupposition is the Fregean Context Principle (PC):

(PC): Only in the context of a complete sentence do the words have meaning.

The third presupposition is Semantic Pluralism (PS), which can be traced back to the second Wittgenstein:

(PS): There are many different ways in which words are meaningful.

From (PS) derives the idea that there are concepts of different orders that contribute in different ways to what is said.

With these presuppositions, I will defend that (PS) is necessary to understand the type of concept that is truth. However, (PS) does not imply that we need a pluralistic theory of the concept of truth itself. The notion of truth is unambiguous and works in the same way in all contexts.

In my intervention, I will make a defense of the pro-sentence theory of truth in a pragmatic context.

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