Definitions of knowledge in the epistemology of virtues

Manuel Pérez Otero ( perez.otero@ub.edu )

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Within the framework of the competency approach to knowledge (the so-called epistemology of virtues), which has Ernesto Sosa as its primary engine, we find –in my opinion– the definitions of propositional knowledge that are less problematic, whether they are the definitions of E. Sosa himself, or those of some other authors. However, I think that this circumstance has not found enough echo in contemporary literature. My presentation is intended to outline an analysis of this situation, for which it will be convenient to reflect on the nature of philosophical definitions.

First, I present the central idea of ​​the epistemology of virtues, as well as three definitions proposed by Sosa in one of his recent books (Sosa 2015). Then I list three desiderata that we could ideally try to satisfy through an optimal definition of knowledge: the desideratum of distancing, the desideratum of comprehensibility, and the reductivist desideratum. Breaking the reductivist desideratum does not deprive an analysis of interest, which can alternatively be conceived - according to Strawson's (1992) distinction - as a connective analysis. I also explore certain criticisms by Williamson (2000) of certain definitions of knowledge, showing that they would only apply against Sosa if they were also applied against Williamson's own definition. Finally, I evaluate the degree to which Sosa's definition of animal knowledge meets each of the three mentioned desiderata; but I also mention other desiderata, including one related to the descriptive adequacy that said definition satisfies better than any of its opponents.